Introduction: Transnationalism
Transnationalism, Steven Vertovec argues, is a slippery concept. Broadly referring 'to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nationstates', the range of phenomena that it describes is a matter of some debate. 2 The origins of the concept can be traced to the early twentieth century. In an essay entitled 'Transnational America' published in 1916, Randolph Bourne developed the idea through a critique of 'Americanization' and of the myth of the 'melting pot' that the 1914-18 war had dramatically exposed. America, he argued, expounded universal principles but was in fact characterised by the persistence of particularism. America's constituent cultural groups were steeped in a highly romanticised idea of old-fashioned European patriotism, which had been stripped of any real sense of community obligation and were assimilated through the promise of freedom, fortune and the conquest of 'material resources'. The result was intolerance and the emergence of a vapid, commercial culture based on competitive advantage. Transnationality, as Bourne understood it, provided a counter to these destructive forces and described the prospect of a new libertarian, democratic culture underpinned by universal principles. Identifying as trans-nationals, Bourne thought, Americans would be able to transcend the ways of the old world and commit to new 'social goals' based on 'the good life of personality lived in the environment of the Beloved Community'. 3 Bourne's understanding might be characterised as centripetal: his concern was to show how particularist currents could be pulled towards the state's central axis. In contrast, contemporary literatures tend to cast transnationalism as a centrifugal force, pulling across and sometimes against states. The six strands that Vertovec identifies within it describe processes of social formation which intensify global relationships (despite the existence of legal, regulatory, cultural borders); the development of structures and systems supporting these relationships, both legal and illegal networks; the creation of global public spaces, virtual or otherwise; the emergence of vehicles and mechanisms supporting global capital flows, particularly transnational corporations; complex patterns of cultural interpenetration, both corporate and grass-roots; and the expression of subversive, anti-hegemonic and antiessential discourses and practices. 4 As Bamyeh observes, in its modern application transnationalism presupposes the very divisions that anarchist political theory disputes: it takes the boundaries of the state as given, typically bypassing the strong historical parallels that exist between transnational transmissions and pre-modern, 'even ancient "world systems"'. 5 Kropotkin shared this view.
As an anti-statist, Kropotkin contested the statist idea that the emergence of European states marked the foundation of political societies. For him, the state represented the degenerative transformation of pre-existing political organisations. And his aim was to expose the state's artificiality by treating fluidity and movement as a sociological norm. On this account, processes of interpenetration and permeability could be read as measures of anarchistic well-being or as indicators of the success of statist principles of solidity and fixity.
Only in the former sense, however, would transnationalism provide long-term stability. In the state system, it created instability. Kropotkin's interest in the fate of the Russian Empire made him acutely sensitive to the tension between the tendency towards state territorialisation, on the one hand, and globalisation, on the other. The general conclusion of his analysis was that in the state system transnationalism bred nationalism and rivalry for the control of resources, threatening violence on a global scale.
In recent anarchist histories transnationalism has provided the springboard to study the networks, movements, communication flows and shared practices that nineteenthcentury activists created and engaged with, particularly as a result exile and forced migration -the processes that Vertovec highlights. The bonds of solidarity that Bourne attached to the concept are also central to these studies, but attached to anarchist diasporas rather than the nation-state. As Constance Bantman argues, pre-war anarchist and syndicalist movements were transnational to the extent that they were prime movers in the development of a 'practical and integrated' international labour movement. 6 From this perspective, the problem that transnationalism confronts is the tension between the Kropotkin's position contained significant tensions and one of the upshots of his analysis was that internationalism, understood as a principle of worker solidarity, only offered a partial solution to the global violence that the state system supported because it was predicated on the acceptance of organisational principles that anarchism disputed.
Kropotkin also argued that it was impossible to think about submerging differences between cultural and language groups. Like Bourne, Kropotkin was interested in the centripetal aspect of transnationalism, but whereas Bourne searched for a principle capable of transcending nationality, Kropotkin embraced national variation, finding the social glue that
Bourne sought in citizenship in anarchist ethics and revolutionary discourses and practices.
As he noted in his memoirs, there was an intimate relationship between the institutional and ethical aspects of his work. Referring to the process of completing Mutual Aid, he wrote:
These researches which I had to make during these studies in order to acquaint myself with the institutions of the barbarian period and with those of the mediaeval free cities, led me to another important research -the part played in history by the State, since its last incarnation in Europe, during the last three centuries. And on the other side, the study of the mutual support institutions at different stages of civilization, led me to examine the evolutionist bases of the sense of justice and of morality in man. 7 Kropotkin's critique of the state pointed to the existence of trans-historical and crosscultural practices which contained the potential for a new kind of cosmopolitan community, Implicitly rejecting the inevitability of the state's rise, Kropotkin looked for factors explaining its success in the failings of the city-states, placing coercion at the heart of his explanation. 12 There were, he argued, three main reasons for the city-states' decline. First was the division of the city population from the village communities. The inability or unwillingness of the cities to liberate the peasantry from their feudal overlords not only meant that the latter retained their economic power base but also that the cities themselves became over-reliant on commerce and industry. Second was the failure of the cities to prevent the rise of inequalities within their walls. Whilst feudal barons skilfully infiltrated the cities, the commercial success of groups within them helped create divisions between rich and poor. The resulting economic inequalities gave rise to social instability which the barons, jealous of the cities' wealth, were able to exploit. 13 The last, and in
Kropotkin's view, most important failing was the cities' inability to embed its own principles and ideals. Always vulnerable to competing principles and wrestling with political disruption, the cities fell victim to the appeal of a statist political idea, which Kropotkin associated with authority, divinity and law. In some of his earliest essays, he had identified the trinity of economic, military and religious elites as the primary forces behind the state and, in terms reminiscent of Rousseau, explained its rise as a consequence of popular gullibility.
14 Naturally, there were particular circumstances which helped explain the increasing purchase of the state. In Russia, Kropotkin linked the decline of popular democracy and the rise of elitism to a geopolitical contest between Novgorod and Moscow and the ability of
Moscovites to court the favour of Mongol invaders through intrigue and bribery. 15 In Mutual Aid, however, he returned to the generic processes and stressed the ideational conditioning that bolstered the statism:
The students of Roman law and the prelates of the Church ... had succeeded in paralyzing the idea -the antique Greek idea -which presided at the foundation of the cities. For two or three hundred years they taught from the pulpit, the University chair, and the judges' bench, that salvation must be sought for in strongly-centralized State, placed under a semi-divine authority; that one man can and must be the saviour of society, and that in the name of public salvation he can commit any violence ... 16 Kropotkin linked the idea of the state to absolutism, epitomised in monarchical rule, but he did not identify its uniqueness with the principle of sovereignty, as early state theorists contended. Rather, he thought that the rise of the state involved the reinterpretation of the principle in the context of political centralisation. Sovereignty, he argued, ultimately devolved to individuals. It was the principle that captured the 'free play for the individual' and the idea that 'no actions are imposed upon the individual by fear of punishment'. 17 Keen to distinguish this position from the ideas advanced by some liberals and individualist anarchists, notably Benjamin Tucker, Kropotkin denied that sovereignty was adequately described as an abstract right or a claim against others, and instead argued that it operated only within a social context. 18 Defined in this manner, sovereignty underwrote the agreements that individuals entered into in their social relations, and it was therefore compatible with the cooperative principle of mutual aid, with which Kropotkin coupled it. In the medieval cities, these agreements supported the jurisdictional claims of the cities' institutions. Like the modern states that succeeded them, each city-state 'had the right of war and peace, of federation and alliance with its neighbours. It was sovereign in its own affairs, and mixed with no others.' 19 The difference was that, in the medieval context, sovereignty was never defined by the law-making power of a single body, be it a monarch or a parliament. This was his point of disagreement with Hobbes and Bodin. For the latter:
... a ship is no more than a load of timber unless there is a keel to hold together the ribs, the prow, the poop and the tiller. Similarly, the commonwealth without sovereign power to unite all its several members, whether families, colleges or corporate bodies, is not a true commonwealth. It is neither the town or its inhabitants that makes a city state, but their union under a sovereign ruler, even if they are only three households. Just as the mouse is as much numbered among animals as the elephant, so the rightly ordered government of only three households, provided they are subject to a sovereign authority, is just as much a commonwealth as a great empire.
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In Kropotkin's view, this argument was a philosophical conceit. Returning to history he outlined the process that lay behind it:
the State must perforce annihilate cities based on direct union between citizens.
It must abolish all union within the city, abolish the city itself, abolish all direct union between cities. To the federative principle it must substitute the principle of submission and discipline. Submission is its substance. Without this principle it leaves off being the State; it becomes a federation. 21 Throwing out the formal-legal doctrine established in the Treaty of Westphalia
Kropotkin argued that in practice sovereignty was divisible. Even if the 'supreme political power' was 'vested entirely in a democratic forum ... ', 22 within the city sovereignty was shared: the guilds and communes that composed it had their own jurisdictions, for example, they assumed 'communal responsibility' for crime, they organised their own decisionmaking forums, militias, religious houses and enterprises. In sum, each city was a double federation of 'households united into small territorial unions -the street, the parish, the section -and of individuals united by oath into guilds according to their professions'. 23 Kropotkin's account of the city-states enabled him to distinguish sovereignty as a principle of 'self-jurisdiction' and 'self-administration' from a hierarchical principle of command. In the former, individuals agreed to give up some of their powers, but they retained their sovereignty, the guarantee of freedom. In the latter, on the Hobbesian account at least, (and its Social Darwinian incarnation was one of Kropotkin's important targets) individuals were right bearers, but never sovereign, and in the process of creating sovereignty, they renounced their rights, or their liberty, and made their effective power conditional on the will of another.
An important implication of this casting was that the concept of the state could be applied to a range of organisational forms, for example, both nation-states and empires. The distinguishing marker was the principle of submission. Kropotkin traced the effects of the transformation of sovereignty in different sociological contexts by examining changes in social relations, processes of territorialisation and inter-state relations.
Looking at the social relations that the city state and the modern state variously fostered he argued that the modern sovereign state 'does not recognize a freely adopted union working within itself. It only deals with subjects. The State and its prop, the Church, arrogate to themselves alone the right of being the connecting link between men'. 24 In the modern era, Kropotkin observed, the vertical domination of social relations threatened to make even the Church redundant. His prediction, which Rudolf Rocker subsequently endorsed, was that the doctrine of political obligation was destined to subsume all other moral commitments and that the state would assume an ethical role. Turning to territorialisation, Kropotkin's second area of concern, he again outlined a transformative process, emphasising the corrupting influence of the state on social organisation. The 'concept of a common territory', he argued, emerged in the pre-Christian times, with the appearance of village communities and the shift from tribal union. 28 Both the principle and the social form could be found across the world, in Europe, Africa and
Central and South America, though the organic nature of village life meant that there could be no 'absolute uniformity' in organisation. 29 Kropotkin acknowledged the exclusivity of territorialism: territory supported the formation of nation groups. Yet he defined nations as 'nothing else' 30 but language communities. Even though he admitted that groups typically adopted leadership structures, he argued that these arrangements were consensual.
Moreover, although he sometimes elided nation with race, he downplayed the idea of shared history and instead emphasised the common practices that territorialism fostered. In village communities it gave rise to customs, institutions and habits that supported cooperation, leading to confederation and cross-cultural exchanges. Kropotkin observed the spontaneous formation of countless 'scientific, literary, artistic and educational societies' in the city rather than the village community. 31 But insofar as cities were spaces for the expression of the same principles of mutual aid and also brought together individuals from different national groups, they attested to the compatibility of territorialism and transnationalism. Kropotkin's important claim, that 'the conception of nations' developed 'long before anything like a State has grown in any part of the continent', supported an ethnographic analysis. 32 Consequently, whereas Bourne understood nations as displaced subject-groups and cast transnationalism as the solution to the loss of meaningful communal bonds, Kropotkin predicated transnationalism on the existence of consensual, national communities and the absence of citizenship and formal democratic structures. 33 With the emergence of state sovereignty, territorialisation served as a platform for colonisation and cultural homogenisation. As historians of modern Europe have shown, a number of phenomena supported these processes: publishing, urbanisation and the development of Universities all played a role. Kropotkin's story focused on the 'wholesale massacres' legal restrictions, land appropriation, taxation and absentee landordlism designed to bring village life under the domination of the state. 34 In relating it, one of his central concerns was to show how colonisation brought nationalism into particularly sharp focus. Russia provided a case study.
In Russia, colonisation had proceeded more slowly in the Empire than in most West
European states and its effects were obvious because of the diversity of its national groups. Turkish control, it mired Russia in years of diplomatic intrigue and war. 38 In the other part, the uncontainable power of political ideology exposed states to critical assessment.
Kropotkin pointed to the egalitarian ideals unleashed by the French revolution, undiminished by the 1815 European settlement, to make the point. 39 His argument was not that revolutionary principles were necessarily coupled with anti-statist claims (even Catherine the Great had dabbled with the ideas of the philosophes), 40 only that the currents of ideas circulating in the post-revolutionary period, which sometimes dovetailed with nationalist aspirations, also had the potential to direct the centrifugal tendencies active in existing states towards anarchy, and that the twin forces of nationalism and radicalism helped explain both the antagonisms of the inter-state relations and its inherent fragility. . 41 Yet in the cities, the jurisdictions were overlapping and the claims to sovereignty were never fixed. Similarly, the cities, in common with village communities, developed forms of self-government. Neither resembled state government because both emerged from the engagement of local people or national groups, supporting systems of decision-making that were decentralised and federal.
Kropotkin's acknowledgement of the state's parasitic relationship with the forms of political organisation that preceded it is important because it suggests that his understanding of the state's abolition did not imply the necessity of total destruction and utopian rebirth, as is sometimes claimed in contemporary anarchist critique, but instead a change of practices. The re-modelling of the mir in Russia after the emancipation was an example of the kind of transformative action that Kropotkin had in mind. Kropotkin's story of the state also clarified the role for anarchist ethics. The city states, he argued, provided spaces for individuals to collectively build institutions that expressed their shared moral rules: from fair trading to charitable giving. Yet they did not remove social tensions, and nor could they. Nevertheless, the nationalist aspirations that statism catalysed pointed to a very different set of possibilities. It was the ambition of the state, through its direct mediation of all social relations, to impose uniformity and compliance. The city states facilitated a much more complex social structure and they succeeded precisely because they gave free reign to local conflicts that direct communal relationships involved. Whereas the state was characterised by immobility and the quality of social life depended on the extent to which it could keep a lid on conflicts, the city state was defined by movement. Struggle, Kropotkin argued, was 'the guarantee of free life in a free city'. The morality of the city states was measured by '[c]onflict freely thrashed out, without an external power, the State, throwing its immense weight into the balance, in favour of one of the struggling forces'. 42 Open disagreement and even violence were indicators of change: it was the 'spirit of routine, originating in superstition, indolence, and cowardice' that was 'the mainstay of oppression'. 
The State: Function and Resistance
Like Max Weber, Kropotkin placed monopoly at the heart of his definition of the state, but whereas Weber treated monopoly as an organisational feature of the state, associating it with the legitimate use of physical force in a given territory, Kropotkin identified monopoly as its function. Modern states, he argued, of course claimed a monopoly in the 'defence of the territory', but their purpose was to serve as instruments 'for establishing monopolies in favour of the ruling minorities'. In the modern European state, the fulfilment of this role permitted 'the few to monopolize the land, and the capitalists to appropriate for themselves a quite disproportionate share of the yearly accumulated surplus of production'. All states, both ancient and modern, served the same purpose. 43 And monopolies were not only established in branches of industry and production, but also, for example, in education, religion and transport. Indeed, monopoly extended even to morality, backed by law.
The State is an institution which was developed for the very purpose of establishing monopolies in favour of the slave and serf owners, the landed proprietors, canonic and laic, and merchant guilds and money-lenders, the kings, the military commanders, the noblemen, and finally, in the nineteenth century, the industrial capitalist, whom the State supplied with "hands" driven away from the land. 44 Kropotkin's language chimed with radical thinking. Like many radicals, he believed that the tendency of the state was towards the extension of directly-controlled monopolies.
Anticipating this development, he argued that the expansion of the state's management functions into 'all social organization including the production and distribution of wealth' threatened to create a new 'form of autocracy', every bit as illiberal as the absolutism that was established on the back of the city states and notwithstanding the increasingly frequent use of the discourse of democracy to legitimate it. 45 However, his parallel critique of capitalism distanced him from those radicals and liberals who argued that the solution to monopoly lay in the free market and mutual recognition of individual rights. 46 Whether it took a public or private form, monopoly was inextricably linked to capitalism and to patterns of ownership, principles of production and systems of international trade that structured social divisions within states and created inequalities between them. 47 In this respect, Kropotkin's ideas resembled Hobson's and Lenin's. Yet because he did not focus his understanding of monopoly on the formation of business cartels or the concentration of the unregulated financial power that drove imperialism, he did not share Hobson's euchronian hopes for the perfection of the market economy and international governance. 48 Similarly, unlike Lenin, whose thought dovetailed with Hobson's, Kropotkin rejected the idea that monopoly described a shift in capitalism which shaped state behaviours and had the potential to transform global political and social relations. From this perspective monopoly was part of a dynamic inter-state relationship, driven by economic rivalries, prestige or 'the honour of kings', 51 stimulating increasingly aggressive competition. 52 To complete the picture, Kropotkin argued that monopoly was underwritten by an international financial system which left all states in hock to bankers but ensured that some states, those who best served the interests of financial elites, occupied the strongest position in the international realm. 53 The dependency of states on banks and the interdependencies that this relationship bred belied the claims to sovereignty that state's advanced, yet the political fiction remained intact, bolstered by the spread of nationalistic sentiments. Kropotkin estimated that 'four-fifths of French savings' were 'poured into' one of five great banks and that organisations from 'foreign States ... railway companies, towns, or industrial companies from the five continents of the globe' were reliant upon them. The profits that the banks made on their loans were enormous, and the machinery at their disposal to 'boom them' was unrivalled. 54 Consistent with his other histories, Kropotkin tracked the origins of international finance back to the collapse of the city states. Republican cities themselves, they began to contract immense debts to their own rich Merchant Guilds. A like phenomenon is to be seen now in modern
States, to which syndicates of bankers are willing to lend against a mortgage on their borrowers' future income. 55 Kropotkin's final reflection on monopoly was that it was unstable. Ordinary miscalculations on the returns of particular capitalist ventures resulted in spectacular economic collapse.
Yet as monopolistic states relied on evermore extensive and sophisticated weaponry to fulfil their domestic function and production was diverted to military purposes, investment decisions were increasingly linked to the anticipation of wars and the expectation of their economic outcomes. Like Weber, then, Kropotkin argued that the monopoly of violence was a characteristic of the state and that there was an inverse relationship between legitimate exercise of domestic violence and the deployment of external force. At the same time,
Kropotkin's contention that monopoly was enmeshed in markets weakened the significance of the territorial dimension of Weber's definition, blurring the distinction between the state's internal and external aspects. For Kropotkin, both were expressions of the complexity of capitalist inter-state relations.
Given the enormity and inter-connectedness of the issues that Kropotkin identified in his analysis of the state, it would be easy to conclude that resistance was futile and that annihilation was a more likely result of social change. Indeed the answer he gave to the question he posed at the end of The State: Its Historic Role -'Will it produce death?' -was:
'It will, unless we reconstitute society on a libertarian and anti-State basis'. 56 Kropotkin's hope was that individuals could be encouraged to regain their initiative, think and act for themselves and shed the habits of 'submission and discipline' 57 inculcated by the state. By taking back the powers that they had theoretically alienated in the process of the state's formation, they would rebuild their local relationships and rescue or re-shape their institutions as they saw fit. Fuelled by moments of high optimism, notably in 1905, Kropotkin never quite gave up hope that a popular anti-state movement would assert itself in direct action, but his underlying fear was that tide of change, at least in the West, was against the anarchists. The tension in his thought is evident in the ideas he explored in a letter to Max Nettlau in 1912:
The State phasis which we are traversing now seems to be unavoidable, but whatever its duration may be, it will never reach now the State Socialist conditions which were once imagined once upon a time by the social democratic and the Vidal school. Before they should come to that, there would be accomplished a complete change in the very forms of modern industrial production. I believe that, so far as we may see forward at this moment, it would be good tactics to help the Labour Unions to enter into a temporary possession of the industrial concerns, under the conditions of delivery at certain established prices their products to given regions of consumers. This would be perhaps an effective means to check the State Nationalisation. 'we prefer those unionists who rely upon their own action to those who cry for State help.
Our propaganda might usefully deal with this question'. 60 Both positions pointed to a particular politics, namely anarcho-communism and to the possibility of building a strong anti-statist, transnational communities. Russia was central to Kropotkin's reasoning, but his well-publicised view that
Prussian militarism 'is a more formidable menace to freedom than even Russian Czarism', reflected his assessment of the development of statism in Europe, rather than a concealed nationalist sentiment. 68 Kropotkin was hardly blind to the evils of Russian autocracy. For years he had spearheaded international campaigns to draw attention to the most repressive aspects of Tsarist rule and explain the revolutionary violence that the regime provoked.
Kropotkin's book, The Terror in Russia, one reader noted, 'enables us to see why a Stolypin meets his death'. 69 Kropotkin's analysis of the state, fleshed out in a critique of German monopoly, on the one hand, and an assessment of the relative weakness of Russian statism, on the other, convinced him that the reassertion of transnational over statist principles demanded resistance to German expansion. As he explained:
All the nationalities which have hitherto been oppressed by the larger nationalities, when they are free to develop their own lines of thought, art, and political growth, will most certainly bring into the common treasury of the world their own most precious features, which they cannot show so long as they are oppressed by a bigger nationality. 
